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Inference-Based Similarity Search in
Randomized Montgomery Domains for
Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification
Yi Wang, Jianwu Wan, Jun Guo, Yiu-Ming Cheung, and Pong C Yuen
Abstract—Similarity search is essential to many important applications and often involves searching at scale on high-dimensional data
based on their similarity to a query. In biometric applications, recent vulnerability studies have shown that adversarial machine learning
can compromise biometric recognition systems by exploiting the biometric similarity information. Existing methods for biometric privacy
protection are in general based on pairwise matching of secured biometric templates and have inherent limitations in search efficiency
and scalability. In this paper, we propose an inference-based framework for privacy-preserving similarity search in Hamming space.
Our approach builds on an obfuscated distance measure that can conceal Hamming distance in a dynamic interval. Such a mechanism
enables us to systematically design statistically reliable methods for retrieving most likely candidates without knowing the exact
distance values. We further propose to apply Montgomery multiplication for generating search indexes that can withstand adversarial
similarity analysis, and show that information leakage in randomized Montgomery domains can be made negligibly small. Our
experiments on public biometric datasets demonstrate that the inference-based approach can achieve a search accuracy close to the
best performance possible with secure computation methods, but the associated cost is reduced by orders of magnitude compared to
cryptographic primitives.
Index Terms—Biometric identification, privacy protection, nearest neighbour search, hypothesis testing, multi-index hashing.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
B EYOND conventional applications in forensic investiga-tions and border control, personal identification based
on biometrics (e.g., face, iris, fingerprint) is also expanding
in the private sector. For instance, hundreds of US healthcare
organizations are using iris and palm-vein biometrics for pa-
tient identification and authentication [1]. India’s DCB Bank
has introduced Aadhaar-based fingerprint-reading ATMs
where customers can access their bank accounts using their
Aadhaar number and biometric details instead of a PIN
[2]. The service is required to connect with the Aadhaar
server for authenticating the identity of a customer every
time a transaction is initiated. Today’s social media websites
provide photo-sharing services and are expected to handle
face search in a database on the order of millions of enrolled
records every day [3]. Such applications of biometric identi-
fication in general involve handling queries and searches at
scale in a networked environment.
Biometric identification systems typically require one-to-
many comparisons by evaluating biometric similarity between
an input query and the database records in some retrieval
space. Security analysis has shown that information leak-
age in storing and processing biometric data can lead to
identity theft and adversarial tracking [4], [5]. In particu-
lar, adversarial machine learning of biometric recognition is
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found possible in the retrieval space [6]. Even if individual
templates are secured in the database, it was shown that
an adversary can still exploit the biometric similarity infor-
mation to compromise system operations. For instance, the
similarity information can be used to fabricate a biometric
spoof in a hill-climbing attack [7] or to perform a biometric
equivalent of the dictionary attack [8]. Another example is
in multibiometric systems where multiple biometric traits
are combined to increase the recognition accuracy and the
population coverage of large-scale personal identification.
Without fabricating any fake trait, it is possible to evade
multibiometric systems if the attacker seizes the genuine
similarity distribution of one single trait [9], [10]. Security
and privacy risks associated with the biometric similarity
information signify the importance of protecting it in the
process of biometric identification.
Binary representations of biometric features are of grow-
ing interest for search applications as they can ensure fast
matching operations in Hamming space [11], [12], [13]. To
achieve high discriminative power and matching accuracy,
binary representations of biometric features typically con-
tain hundreds, if not thousands, of bits [13], [14]. Moreover,
due to acquisition noise and other factors, biometric features
are known to have inherently large intra-class variations
between samples that are taken from the same trait. This
indicates that the input query is not likely to find an iden-
tical match in the biometric database and the true match
may have a relatively large distance, i.e., the number of
mismatching bits, to the query for similarity evaluation in
Hamming space. Rather than exhaustively exploring the
database by pairwise comparisons, nearest neighbour (NN)
methods for long binary representations with a large search
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radius of interest are proposed for fast retrieval in Hamming
space [11], [15], [16]. These methods are designed to reduce
the matching complexity of a similarity search by using
certain data structures, e.g., hash tables.
Without privacy protection in design, NN methods have
built-in mechanisms that are vulnerable to information
leakage. For example, search indexes are often generated
directly from biometric features through distance-preserving
transformations [12], [13], [17], [18]. This allows an ad-
versary who can access the data structures to analyse the
search indexes and glean critical similarity information
of the dataset. Another source of information leakage is
at the retrieval stage. To increase the retrieval accuracy,
NN methods generally require distance computations and
comparisons between the query and matching candidates
retrieved from the data structure. From the perspective of
privacy protection, it is desirable to return the retrieval
results in order without revealing their distance values [19].
Secure multiparty computation techniques are proposed
in the context of one-to-one verification to protect biometric
similarity evaluations [5], [19], [20], [21]. They are mostly
based on combining cryptographic primitives such as ho-
momorphic encryption and garbled circuits to process en-
crypted biometric data without the need of decrypting them.
As distance measures are not preserved in the encrypted
domain, adversarial learning can be effectively prevented.
In our context of one-to-many identification, however, a
similarity search must return multiple candidates in order
according to their similarity measures to the query. The
process involves not only intensive distance computations
but also intensive distance comparisons that are especially
cumbersome to perform in the encrypted domain [22].
In this paper, we propose an inference-based framework
for privacy-preserving similarity search of biometric identi-
ties in Hamming space. We argue that, from the perspective
of adversarial machine learning, an attacker must collect
sufficient and reliable training data that characterise the
underlying biometric feature space. This motivates us to
design effective mechanisms to diffuse the feature infor-
mation over piecewise obfuscated sub-hash codes, rather
than concealing everything in the encrypted domain. In this
way, we aim to facilitate information-theoretic privacy in the
design of hash-based indexing methods without sacrificing
too much of search accuracy and efficiency.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We start with the Hamming-ball search problem and
model it as binary channel estimation for which
we derive the optimal decision rule based on the
theory of binary hypothesis testing. This enables the
design of an inference-based approach for detecting,
with a high accuracy in the retrieval space, matching
candidates within a predefined neighbourhood of the
query without knowing the actual distance values.
• As a key element of the binary channel, we present a
distance obfuscation mechanism based on matching
piecewise obfuscated binary codes for hash-based
similarity search. We derive analytically the condi-
tion where it is guaranteed to have a substring colli-
sion for neighbouring pairs, and show how it gives
rise to an obfuscated distance measure that conceals
the Hamming distance in a dynamic interval.
• We show how the inference-based approach for
Hamming-ball search can be extended to handle
a test-based rank-ordered search that arranges the
retrieved candidates in rank order without the need
of comparing distance values. We further show how
to perform an approximate NN search by choosing
candidates based on the obfuscated distance measure
with or without the need of test-based ranking.
• We apply Montgomery multiplication to generate
privacy-preserving search indexes that allow detec-
tion of substring collisions in randomized Mont-
gomery domains. This enables the design of a search
protocol that restricts all parties involved in the pro-
cess to perform their respective computations in sep-
arate Montgomery domains for privacy protection.
• We study the privacy-preserving strength of our
search scheme in an information-theoretic approach.
In particular, we quantify the privacy gain of in-
dexing in randomized Montgomery domains, and
analyze how difficult it is for an adversary to infer
biometric identities from search indexes in the pro-
posed indexing and retrieval process.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 provides the
details of the inference-based similarity search framework.
Section 4 presents the design of index generation in ran-
domized Montgomery domains and the description of the
search protocol. Analysis of the privacy-preserving strength
is presented in Section 5. Performance evaluation is reported
in Section 6. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Biometric privacy study has been largely focused on en-
abling one-to-one matching without revealing the biometric
features that characterize an individual, known as biometric
template protection [4], [23], [24]. Depending on how the
protected reference is generated and matched, template
protection schemes can be classified into bio-cryptosystems
and feature transformations [4]. Bio-cryptosystems generate
error correction codewords for an indirect matching of bio-
metric templates [23]. They typically yield a yes/no decision
for verification on one-to-one basis, which is not suitable
for returning candidates in the order of their matching de-
grees. Feature transformation methods apply non-invertible
functions to biometric templates [24]. The protected refer-
ences are usually distance preserving to perform matching
directly in the transformed space.
Recently, secure signal processing methods have been
introduced to protect biometric matching by concealing
both the feature contents and similarity evaluation in the
encrypted domain [5], [20], [25], [26]. These techniques use
cryptographic primitives as a wrapper of distance-related
functions. Thus, a privacy-preserving similarity search can
be decomposed into two steps: secure distance computa-
tion followed by minimum (distance) finding via oblivious
transfer [27]. As unauthorized information gathering is pre-
cluded in the encrypted domain, secrecy and accuracy can
be ensured in pairwisematching for biometric identification.
However, cryptographic primitives are generally associated
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with high computation costs and excessive communication
overheads. For instance, minimum finding is very complex
to perform in the encrypted domain. It demands pairwise
comparison of all encrypted distance values and frequent
interactions between the query and the database [22]. This
makes it intrinsically difficult, if not impossible, to meet
the efficiency and scalability requirements of search applica-
tions, especially when dealing with high-dimensional data,
in the encrypted domain [22], [27].
Other than search in the encrypted domain, the concept
of search with reduced reference is proposed in privacy-
preserving content-based information retrieval to protect
the original content and accelerate the search simultane-
ously [22], [28], [29]. The basic idea therein is to enforce
k-anonymity or l-diversity properties by raising the ambi-
guity level of a data collection [30], [31]. Techniques of this
paradigm are mostly based on randomized embedding [27]
and in particular locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [28], [32],
[33], [34]. LSH performs approximate NN search by hashing
similar items into the same bucket and those that are distant
from one another into different buckets, respectively, with
high probabilities. However, LSH by itself does not guar-
antee privacy [27], [33], [34]. It requires all parties involved
in a search to use the same random keys in generating hash
codes. Moreover, to achieve a good precision in search, LSH-
based algorithms usually require a large number of random
hash functions and may increase privacy risks [35].
Privacy-enhanced variants of LSH are recently proposed
by combining LSH with cryptographic or information-
theoretic protocols [27]. The privacy protection framework
proposed in [28] generates a partial query instance by omit-
ting certain bits in one or more sub-hash values to increase
the ambiguity of query information for the server. The hash
values of retrieved candidates are returned to the client for
refinement. The framework is extended in [29] where partial
encryption is performed on the hash code of each item
to prevent an untrustworthy server from precisely linking
queries and database records. In particular, the server uses
the unencrypted part of each item for approximate indexing
and search while the client uses the encrypted part for re-
ranking the candidates received from the server. To limit
the number of candidates sent to the client, the server
performs a preliminary ranking based on the partial distance
computed from the unencrypted part. The trade-off between
privacy and utility of a search at the server side is therefore
controlled by the number of unencrypted bits. We call this
approach “LSH + partial distance” for brevity and will use
it as one baseline approach for performance comparison.
3 PRIVACY-PRESERVING SIMILARITY SEARCH
In this section, we study the privacy-preserving similarity
search problem in the framework of binary hypothesis
testing. Section 3.1 details how we model the Hamming-
ball search problem as binary channel estimation. Section
3.2 derives the decision rule for the binary hypothesis test.
Section 3.3 presents the design of the distance obfuscation
mechanism and the obfuscated distance measure. Section
3.4 describes the test-based rank-ordered search scheme and
discusses how to perform an approximate NN search based
on the obfuscated distance measure.
Fig. 1. Inference-based r-neighbour detection modelled as binary chan-
nel estimation with decision rule δ.
3.1 Inference-Based Hamming-Ball Search
Consider a set Ω of binary strings, each of which represents
a biometric identity and is of length D bits. Note that D
is typically large for biometric data. The query q is also
of length D bits. As binary embedding is usually distance-
preserving, we treat two biometric identities as similar if
their Hamming distance is close.
Any string p ∈ Ω is considered to be an r-neighbour of the
query q if the Hamming distance between p and q, denoted
by d(p,q), satisfies d(p,q) ≤ r. All strings p ∈ Ω that
satisfy d(p,q) ≤ r constitute the set, denoted by B(q; r),
of r-neighbours of the query q within its neighbourhood
of Hamming radius r. This is known as the r-neighbour
detection or Hamming-ball search problem [15]. A related
problem, known as k-NN search, is to find k records in Ω
that are closest in Hamming distance to the query q. We first
resolve the r-neighbour detection problem, and later show
how it can be extended to handle the k-NN search problem.
Our inference-based approach for r-neighbour detection
requires a distance obfuscation mechanism to conceal the
exact value of d(p,q) in a certain interval [a, b], where
both variables a and b take on integer values and satisfy
a ≤ d(p,q) ≤ b. In this way, it is clear that d(p,q) > r if
r < a and d(p,q) < r if r > b. There is an uncertainty
in comparing d(p,q) with r when a ≤ r ≤ b. In this
case, we consider that an estimate of d(p,q), denoted by
dˆ(p,q), is randomly chosen from the interval [a, b] with
equal probability. Then,
Pr{dˆ(p,q) ≤ r} =
r − a+ 1
b− a+ 1
. (1)
For convenience, let
pi
def
=
r − a+ 1
b− a+ 1
(2)
from which we have 1/(b − a + 1) ≤ pi ≤ 1 for a ≤ r ≤ b,
and the value of pi depends on a and b for any given r.
We make inference based on the variable pi. Specifically,
let x = 0 if d(p,q) > r and x = 1 if d(p,q) ≤ r. Let
Y be a binary random variable taking on values y = 0 if
pi < η and y = 1 if pi ≥ η, where η ∈ (0, 1) is a predefined
threshold. We resolve the r-neighbour detection problem as
a binary hypothesis testH0 : x = 0, H1 : x = 1 that predicts
the original binary input x based on a decision rule δ as a
function δ(y) of the values of Y .
This can be regarded as a binary channel estimation
problem [36] where a binary digit x is transmitted over
some noisy channel that outputs a random observation Y
with outcome being either 0 or 1, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Due to uncertainties introduced by distance obfuscation and
threshold comparison, the original binary input x may be
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received as Y 6= xwith probabilities λ0 = Pr{Y = 1|x = 0}
and λ1 = Pr{Y = 0 | x = 1}. We wish to find an optimal
way to decide what was transmitted based on the values of
Y . In the following section, we design the decision rule δ
given the “transmission” error probabilities λ0 and λ1.
3.2 Design of the Decision Rule δ
Any decision rule δ is associated with two types of errors
in testing the null hypothesis (i.e., H0) versus the alternative
hypothesis (i.e., H1). Let PF(δ) denote the false-alarm prob-
ability thatH1 is falsely accepted whenH0 is true. Let PM(δ)
denote the miss probability that H1 is falsely rejected when
H1 is true. The detection probability PD(δ) = 1 − PM(δ)
is also called the power of the decision rule δ. There is
a fundamental trade-off between PF(δ) and PM(δ) in the
hypothesis test. According to the Neyman-Pearson criteria
[37], the optimal decision rule is the one to the constrained
optimization problem: maxδ PD(δ) subject to PF(δ) ≤ α,
with α being the significance level of the test. The Neyman-
Pearson lemma [37] states that the likelihood ratio test is the
most powerful test.
Consider the binary channel estimation problem in
Fig. 1. The observation Y has probability mass functions
px(y) = λx if y 6= x and px(y) = 1 − λx if y = x, for
x = 0, 1. The likelihood ratio for an observation Y = y is
thus given by
L(y) =
p1(y)
p0(y)
=


λ1
1− λ0
, if y = 0
1− λ1
λ0
, if y = 1 .
(3)
The Neyman-Pearson test rejects H0 for L(Y ) > η for some
η, and η is chosen such that Pr{L(Y ) > η} = α if H0 is
true. When λ0 +λ1 < 1, the Neyman-Pearson decision rule,
which is the conditional probability of accepting H1 given
that we observe Y = y, turns out to be [36]
δ˜NP(y) =


α
λ0
, if y = 1
0, if y = 0
(4)
for 0 ≤ α < λ0, and
δ˜NP(y) =


1, if y = 1
α− λ0
1− λ0
, if y = 0
(5)
for λ0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The resulting detection probability is
PD(δ˜NP) =


α
(
1− λ1
λ0
)
, if 0 ≤ α < λ0
1− λ1 + λ1
(
α− λ0
1− λ0
)
, if λ0 ≤ α < 1 .
(6)
It can be seen in (5) that δ˜NP(y) = y when α = λ0. In
other words, by allowing PF(δ) ≤ λ0, the simple decision
rule δ(y) = y that accepts Hx if y = x yields the same
performance as the most powerful test according to the
Neyman-Pearson criteria. The resulting detection probabil-
ity is PD(δ) = 1−λ1. In this case, the inherent transmission
error probability serves as an upper bound of the hypothesis
testing error probability, i.e., PF(δ) +PM(δ) ≤ λ0 +λ1. This
enables us to design the binary channel directly through a
trade-off between the channel characteristics λ0 and λ1.
3.3 Design of the Binary Channel
As discussed in Section 3.1, the binary channel in our con-
text is in the form of a noisy channel that consists of distance
obfuscation followed by threshold comparison. The former
maps a distance value into an interval [a, b] that defines pi in
(2). The latter yields λ0 and λ1 under the null and alternative
hypotheses, respectively. Here, we present a distance obfus-
cation mechanism based on matching piecewise obfuscated
binary codes in a carefully designed multi-index multi-probe
(MIMP) scheme for hash-based similarity search.
Specifically, for all strings p ∈ Ω and the query q,
we divide each of them into L non-overlapping segments,
denoted by {p(1),p(2), . . . ,p(L)} and {q(1),q(2), . . . ,q(L)}.
By definition, we have p = p(1)||p(2)|| . . . ||p(L) and q =
q
(1)||q(2)|| . . . ||q(L), where || is the concatenation operator.
If the string length D is divisible by L, each substring is of
length s = D/L bits. If D is not divisible by L, each of the
first (D mod L) substrings is of length s = ⌈D/L⌉ bits, and
each of the remaining substrings has s− 1 bits.
For each substring p(i) of p, i = 1, 2, . . . , L, we create
a set V
p(i) containing p
(i) and a one-bit variant of p(i) that
differs from p(i) by one bit at a randomly selected position.
For convenience, we write V
p(i) = {p˜
(i)
j } where j = 0, 1,
with p˜
(i)
0 = p
(i) and p˜
(i)
1 being the one-bit variant of p
(i).
For each substring q(i) of the query q, i = 1, 2, . . . , L, we
create a set that contains all possible one-bit variants of q(i),
denoted by V
q(i) = {q˜
(i)
k }, where k = 1, 2, . . . , s if the
substring is of length s bits and k = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1 if the
substring has s−1 bits. We call a match between p˜
(i)
j ∈ Vp(i)
and q˜
(i)
k ∈ Vq(i) as a substring collision. Let C(Vp(i) ,Vq(i))
denote the collision count (i.e., the number of all possible
substring collisions) between V
p(i) and Vq(i) .
Proposition 1. The collision count between V
p(i) and Vq(i) sat-
isfies C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) ≤ 1 for all i. The case C(Vp(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1
implies d(p(i),q(i)) ≤ 2. The case C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 0 implies
d(p(i),q(i)) ≥ 2.
Proof. The following cases hold for each i = 1, 2, . . . , L.
• If d(p(i),q(i)) = 0, we have C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1, since
p˜
(i)
0 6= q˜
(i)
k for all k and there exists exactly one q˜
(i)
k ∈
V
q(i) such that p˜
(i)
1 = q˜
(i)
k .
• If d(p(i),q(i)) = 1, we have C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1, since
p˜
(i)
1 6= q˜
(i)
k for all k and there exists exactly one q˜
(i)
k ∈
V
q(i) such that p˜
(i)
0 = q˜
(i)
k .
• If d(p(i),q(i)) = 2, we have C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) ≤ 1
where the equality holds if and only if the one-bit
variant of p(i) flips at a bit position at which p(i) and
q
(i) differ.
• If d(p(i),q(i)) > 2, we have C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 0, since
p˜
(i)
j 6= q˜
(i)
k for all j, k.
Corollary 1. The sum of collision count C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) over all
i is at most L, i.e.,
∑L
i=1 C(Vp(i) ,Vq(i)) ≤ L.
Corollary 2. Since 0 ≤ d(p(i),q(i)) ≤ s, we have 0 ≤
d(p(i),q(i)) ≤ 2 given C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1, and 2 ≤
d(p(i),q(i)) ≤ s given C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 0.
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Proposition 2. If p ∈ B(q; r) with r < 2L, then there exists at
least one i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L, such that C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 0 for all i. By Propo-
sition 1, we must have d(p(i),q(i)) ≥ 2 for all i. Then,
d(p,q) =
∑L
i=1 d(p
(i),q(i)) ≥ 2L. That is, we have
p /∈ B(q; r) with r < 2L, which gives a contradiction.
Let m denote the sum of collision count C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i))
over all i, i.e.,
m =
L∑
i=1
C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) . (7)
Proposition 2 suggests that, under the condition r < 2L,
the MIMP scheme ensures that any r-neighbor of the query
q has a non-zero value of m. We shall see that m serves
as an obfuscated distance measure and is key to the design
of the inference-based r-neighbor detection approach in our
context. Note that m ≤ L from Corollary 1. Without loss
of generality, let us assume that C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1 for i =
1, 2, ...,m and C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 0 for i = m+ 1, ..., L. Then,
by Corollary 2, we have 0 ≤
∑m
i=1 d(p
(i),q(i)) ≤ 2m and
2(L − m) ≤
∑L
i=m+1 d(p
(i),q(i)) ≤ s(L − m). Since by
definition
d(p,q) =
m∑
i=1
d(p(i),q(i)) +
L∑
i=m+1
d(p(i),q(i)) (8)
we know that d(p,q) is within the range given by
2(L−m) ≤ d(p,q) ≤ s(L −m) + 2m . (9)
Substituting a = 2(L −m) and b = s(L −m) + 2m in (2),
we obtain
pi =
2− (2L− 1− r)/m
(sL − 2L+ 1)/m+ 4− s
(10)
for 2(L−m) ≤ r ≤ s(L−m) + 2m or, equivalently,
L−
r
2
≤ m ≤
sL− r
s− 2
. (11)
Note that, with r < 2L, we must have (sL− r)/(s− 2) > L.
Since m ≤ L by Corollary 1, we rewrite (11) as
L−
r
2
≤ m ≤ L . (12)
In addition, with s ≥ 2, pi in the form of (10) monoton-
ically increases as m increases. Accordingly, based on the
definition of pi, a larger value of m corresponds to a higher
probability that p is an r-neighbour of q.
As a result of (12), any string p ∈ Ω with m < L − r/2
is not an r-neighbour of the query q. On the other hand, all
strings p ∈ Ω with m being in the inference region defined
by (12) are subjected to the hypothesis testing, from which
we can obtain through (10) the empirical probability mass
functions of pi under hypothesis H0 and hypothesis H1,
respectively, and then choose a value for the threshold η
to set the channel characteristics λ0 and λ1.
For example, let us consider the UBIRIS dataset [38] and
use 400 eyes each with 10 iris images. Each iris image is
represented by an iris code of 400 bits generated using a
rotation invariant ordinal feature coding scheme [13]. We
enroll each eye with one iris code at a time, and then use an-
other iris code from the same eye to search. This is run for 24
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
pi
Pr
ob
ab
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y
 
 
η=0.1144
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H1
Fig. 2. Empirical probability mass functions of pi under H0 and H1,
respectively, with the UBIRIS dataset, given L = 30 and r = 50.
Choosing η = 0.1144 minimizes λ0 + λ1.
times with different enrollments and queries, which results
in a total of 3,840,000 pairwise comparisons, including 6,026
neighbouring pairs and 3,833,974 non-neighbouring pairs as
ground truth, given the Hamming radius r = 50.
We set L = 30 and perform the MIMP scheme in each
run. All enrolled strings whose m value with respect to
corresponding queries satisfying (12), which is 5 ≤ m ≤ 30
in this example, are subjected to inference. This involves
6,026 neighbouring pairs and 5,859 non-neighbouring pairs.
Comparing with the ground truth, the inference set includes
all neighbouring pairs and a small fraction (i.e., 0.15 percent)
of non-neighbouring pairs. By (10), the pi values can be
evaluated for these instances. Fig. 2 plots the empirical prob-
ability mass functions of pi under H0 and H1, respectively.
We choose the threshold η to minimize λ0 + λ1 for the
binary channel, which we recall is the upper bound of the
hypothesis testing error probabilityPF(δ)+PM(δ) as a result
of the chosen decision rule δ(y) = y discussed in Section 3.2.
Note that we may also choose a smaller η value to increase
the detection probability PD(δ), i.e., 1 − λ1, by allowing a
larger λ0. In Fig. 2, η = 0.1144, which yields λ0 = 0.082 and
λ1 = 0.036. Given the η value, the inference-based approach
determines if an enrolment is an r-neighbour of the query
by testing if its pi value satisfies pi ≥ η. Accordingly, taking
into account all the 3,840,000 pairwise comparisons in this
example, the overall detection probability is 96.4 percent
and the overall false-alarm probability is 0.0125 percent.
3.4 Test-Based Rank-Ordered Search
Conventionally, a rank-ordered search is done by ordering
the retrieved candidates according to their distance values.
In this section, we present a test-based rank-ordered search
scheme without the need of comparing distance values.
The basic idea is to apply our proposed inference-based
r-neighbour detection approach and evaluate a series of
nested inference regions with sequentially increased values
of the Hamming radius r.
Take the UBIRIS dataset for example. Let us consider
three values for the Hamming radius r as shown in Table 1,
i.e., r1 = 30, r2 = 40, r3 = 50. We perform the MIMP
scheme with L = 30. Thus, the inference region I defined
by (12) for each corresponding r value is I1 = [15, 30], I2 =
[10, 30], I3 = [5, 30], respectively. Note that in the case of
the MIMP scheme, as long as L is fixed, the m value of
any enrollment remains the same regardless of the r value.
ACCEPTED BY IEEE TRANS. PATTERN ANAL. AND MACH. INTELL. 6
TABLE 1
Inference-based r-neighbour detection over the UBIRIS dataset
Hamming radius r 30 40 50
Inference region I [15, 30] [10, 30] [5, 30]
Threshold η for pi 0.1064 0.1110 0.1144
Threshold µ form 22 19 16
Overall detection probability 96.5% 95.9% 96.4%
Overall false-alarm probability 0.0186% 0.0140% 0.0125%
For each value of r, we obtain through (10) the empirical
probability mass functions of pi, and choose the threshold
η to minimize λ0 + λ1. For the UBIRIS dataset, it turns out
that η1 = 0.1064, η2 = 0.1110, η3 = 0.1144, respectively.
Once the η values are learned, we can determine if an
enrollment p is an r-neighbour of the query q by testing if
the pi value of p satisfies pi ≥ η. Given pi in the form of (10),
it can be shown that testing pi ≥ η is equivalent to testing
m ≥
η(sL − 2L+ 1) + 2L− 1− r
2 + η(s− 4)
def
= µ . (13)
Note in (13) that it suffices for µ to assume integer values
since m in this context takes on integer values only. Thus,
for the UBIRIS dataset, we have µ1 = 22, µ2 = 19, µ3 = 16,
respectively. The resulting detection probability and false-
alarm probability of r-neighbour detection are provided in
Table 1 for each value of r.
Given µ1 > µ2 > µ3 and since the inference region I
is nested, i.e., I1 ⊂ I2 ⊂ I3, the inferred set B
′(q; r) of r-
neighbours of the query q in this case must also be nested,
i.e., B′(q; r1) ⊂ B
′(q; r2) ⊂ B
′(q; r3). In general, if we
consider G sequentially increased values of the Hamming
radius r and given that the inferred set of r-neighbours is
nested, we can order the retrieved candidates in G ranks.
In particular, those in the set B′(q; r1) are designated as
Rank 1 candidates. Subsequently, for g = 2, 3, . . . , G, those
in B′(q; rg)−B
′(q; rg−1) form the set of Rank g candidates.
As a special case, an approximate k-NN search can
be performed by finding the smallest G such that the set
B′(q; rG) contains at least k candidates. We return all candi-
dates in the top G − 1 ranks, and the remaining candidates
are chosen from Rank G candidates arbitrarily. The latter
is due to the nature of binary hypothesis testing where
candidates in the same rank are considered to be of the same
similarity level to the query regardless of their m values. It
is interesting to observe that, in the case of the test-based
rank-ordered search, given µi > µj , the m values of Rank i
candidates must be larger than those of Rank j candidates.
This observation motivates us to further consider a simple
implementation of k-NN search where we simply choose
the top k candidates in descending order of the m value
without the need of test-based ranking.
4 PRIVACY-PRESERVING INDEX GENERATION
In Section 3, we introduced an inference-based approach
for similarity search. The MIMP scheme works by matching
piecewise obfuscated binary codes and enables hash-based
indexing of biometric identities. This can be regarded as
substring obfuscation by introducing controlled “noise” to
piecewise biometric data before disseminating them over
hash tables. However, as shown in Section 5.3, from the
perspective of privacy protection, such segments of biomet-
ric data should not be used directly as search indexes and
stored in hash tables. Cryptographic hashing may be used to
generate secure signatures. However, standard cipher codes
typically have hundreds of bits, e.g., 256 bits by SHA-256,
while codes of length longer than 32 bits are not suitable for
indexing data structures [15]. Subdivision of cipher codes
does not help as Hamming distances are not preserved
after encryption. In this paper, we address the problem by
indexing in randomized Montgomery domains.
4.1 Indexing in Montgomery Domains
Montgomery multiplication has been used in cryptographic
schemes mainly for implementing fast modulo operations
with large-integer arithmetic [39]. Here, we exploit its el-
ementary form to generate randomized signatures. Specif-
ically, let N be a prime number, and let R be a positive
integer that is coprime to N , i.e., gcd(R,N) = 1. The
Montgomery form of an integer x is defined as
M(x;R,N) = xR mod N (14)
whereN is the modulus andR is the multiplier. We also call
M(x;R,N) as the (R,N)-residue of x following Definition
9.2.2 in [39]. In our context, for a binary string p(i) of length
s bits, its Montgomery form can be evaluated by the sum of
(R,N)-residues at each one-bit position in p(i). That is,
M(p(i);R,N) =
( s∑
b=1
p
(i)[b] · 2b−1
)
R mod N
=
s∑
b=1
p
(i)[b] ·M(2b−1;R,N) mod N
(15)
where p(i)[b] ∈ {0, 1}. The reference M(2b−1;R,N) may
be pre-computed for large-integer arithmetic. We regard
(15) as a projection of p(i) into the Montgomery domain of
(R,N)-residues, also called the (R,N)-domain for brevity.
Note that Montgomery multiplication does not preserve the
original distance values and thus the resulting signatures
can withstand adversarial similarity analysis.
We consider a three-party scenario that involves a user,
a data owner and a server, which is typical in a networked
computing environment like cloud [21]. The data owner
is responsible for user enrolment, server registration and
index generation. The server maintains the hash tables and
provides the computation-intensive task of similarity search
on behalf of the data owner. Upon a query from the user,
the server retrieves the most likely candidates and returns
the search results to the user. Fig. 3 illustrates the main
procedures of our three-party protocol that enables similar-
ity search in randomized Montgomery domains. They are
described below in more details.
User Enrolment: The user generates the binary string p
from biometric data and divides it into L substrings {p(i)},
each of which is associated with a set V
p(i) as described
in Section 3.3. For each chosen modulus N
(i)
u , the user
randomly generates a multiplierR
(i)
u that is coprime toN
(i)
u ,
and maps all p˜
(i)
j ∈ Vp(i) into the (R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )-domain. Then,
the user sendsM(p˜
(i)
j ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u ) as the signature of p˜
(i)
j for
all i, j to the data owner.
ACCEPTED BY IEEE TRANS. PATTERN ANAL. AND MACH. INTELL. 7
Fig. 3. Main procedures of the three-party search protocol.
Server Registration: For provision of service, the server
registers at the data owner with a set of moduli {N
(i)
s }.
Then, for each i, the data owner randomly generates a
multiplier R
(i)
o that is coprime to N
(i)
s for index generation.
Index Generation: The data owner maps the
user’s signature M(p˜
(i)
j ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u ) into the (R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s )-
domain, and then sends the nested Montgomery form
M(M(p˜
(i)
j ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u );R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ) for all p˜
(i)
j ∈ Vp(i) to the
server for indexing p(i) in the i-th hash table. To enable
the user to search at the server, the data owner randomly
generates for each i a multiplierR
(i)
q that is coprime toN
(i)
s ,
and sends R
(i)
q for all i to the user. Let R
′(i)
q be a modular
multiplicative inverse of R
(i)
q modulo N
(i)
s , i.e.,
R(i)q R
′(i)
q mod N
(i)
s = 1 . (16)
The data owner also computes
R(i)s =M(R
′(i)
q ;R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ) (17)
and sends the resulting multiplier R
(i)
s for all i to the server.
Query and Search: The user divides the query q into L
substrings and, for each substring q(i), generates a set V
q(i)
as described in Section 3.3. For each i, the user maps all
q˜
(i)
k ∈ Vq(i) into the (R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )-domain, and computes
z
(i)
k =M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )R
(i)
q (18)
using the multiplier R
(i)
q . The user sends z
(i)
k to the server
who in turn maps it into the (R
(i)
s , N
(i)
s )-domain. Note
that the result M(z
(i)
k ;R
(i)
s , N
(i)
s ) and the nested Mont-
gomery form of q˜
(i)
k , i.e.,M(M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u );R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ),
are equivalent. This is because, by (15)-(18) and using the
congruence relation a(b mod n) ≡ ab mod n (mod n) that
holds for all positive integers a, b, n, we have
M(z
(i)
k ;R
(i)
s , N
(i)
s ) =M(M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )R
(i)
q ;R
(i)
s , N
(i)
s )
=M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )R
(i)
q (R
′(i)
q R
(i)
o mod N
(i)
s ) mod N
(i)
s
=M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )R
(i)
q R
′(i)
q R
(i)
o mod N
(i)
s mod N
(i)
s
=M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )R
(i)
o (R
(i)
q R
′(i)
q mod N
(i)
s ) mod N
(i)
s
=M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u )R
(i)
o mod N
(i)
s
=M(M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u );R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ) .
(19)
Thus, the server can use the (R
(i)
s , N
(i)
s )-residue of z
(i)
k to
probe the search indexes in the i-th hash table and perform
the MIMP scheme as described in Section 3.3.
4.2 Substring Collision in Montgomery Domains
Note that, given a substring collision between p˜
(i)
j ∈ Vp(i)
and q˜
(i)
k ∈ Vq(i) , we must have
M(M(p˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u );R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ) =
M(M(q˜
(i)
k ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u );R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ) .
(20)
However, having (20) does not necessarily imply p˜
(i)
j = q˜
(i)
k .
Therefore, collision detection based on (20) may result in
false positives but no false negatives. In other words, match-
ing in Montgomery domains may increase the false-alarm
probability but have no effect on the detection probability in
our inference-based similarity search scheme. To reduce the
false positives, we enhance the search protocol by index-
ing in Montgomery domains using multiple independently
generated signatures rather than one. The idea can be con-
veniently explained by considering two arbitrary substrings
of length s bits as follows.
Let x and y be the natural number representation of the
two substrings, respectively. We first consider T randomly
chosen pairs of (Rt, Nt), t = 1, 2, . . . , T , each yielding
a Montgomery form for x and y. For convenience, let
γt(x) = M(x;Rt, Nt) and γt(y) = M(y;Rt, Nt), and let
γ(x) = {γt(x)} and γ(y) = {γt(y)} denote the set of T
randomized signatures for x and y, respectively. In this way,
we consider the two substrings matched, i.e., x = y, if and
only if γ(x) = γ(y), i.e., γt(x) = γt(y) for all t.
Suppose thatRt is encoded by cR bits, i.e., 0 < Rt < 2
cR ,
and Nt is encoded by cN bits, i.e., 0 < Nt < 2
cN . Then, the
binary code of xRt and yRt has s + cR bits. Let ν(2
cN) be
the number of primes in the range (0, 2cN). We choose each
modulus Nt independently from the ν(2
cN) prime numbers
at random with equal probability. A prime number is “bad”
for matching x and y if the random choice of Nt results in
a false positive, i.e., γt(x) = γt(y) given x 6= y. It is known
that, for s+cR < ν(2
cN), there can be at most s+cR−1 such
“bad” prime numbers in the range (0, 2cN) [40]. Since every
prime number has an equal probability of being chosen, the
probability Pr{γt(x) = γt(y) | x 6= y} is bounded by
s+ cR − 1
ν(2cN)
def
= β(s; cR, cN) . (21)
The false positive probability Pr{γ(x) = γ(y) | x 6= y} is
therefore bounded by β(s; cR, cN)
T , which can be controlled
by tuning the parameters cR, cN and T for a given s.
Next, consider the nested Montgomery form for x and
for y. That is, for each γt(x) and γt(y), we further choose
T pairs of (Rv, Nv), v = 1, 2, . . . , T , independently at
random. Each pair of (Rv, Nv) yields the nested Mont-
gomery formM(γt(x);Rv , Nv) for x andM(γt(y);Rv, Nv)
for y. For convenience, let ψtv(x) = M(γt(x);Rv, Nv) and
ψtv(y) = M(γt(y);Rv, Nv). Accordingly, we generate a
set of T 2 randomized signatures for x and y, denoted by
ψ(x) = {ψtv(x)} and ψ(y) = {ψtv(y)}, respectively. In this
way, we consider x = y if and only if ψ(x) = ψ(y), i.e.,
ψtv(x) = ψtv(y) for all t and v. Since Nt < 2
cN , both γt(x)
and γt(y) can be encoded by cN bits. Setting s = cN in (21)
yields Pr{ψtv(x) = ψtv(y) | γt(x) 6= γt(y)} ≤ β(cN; cR, cN).
Then, it can be shown that Pr{ψtv(x) = ψtv(y) | x 6= y} is
bounded by β(s + cN; 2cR, cN). The resulting false positive
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T
2
with respect to the modulus encoding
length cN for T = 1, 2, 3, given s = 14 and cR = 15.
probability Pr{ψ(x) = ψ(y) | x 6= y} in the case of using
nested Montgomery forms as search indexes is therefore
bounded by β(s+ cN; 2cR, cN)
T 2 .
Fig. 4 plots the bound β(s+cN; 2cR, cN)
T 2 with respect to
the parameter cN for T = 1, 2, 3, given s = 14 and cR = 15.
It can be seen that the bound reduces drastically as cN or
T increases. For example, with T = 2, cN = 15 and hence
ν(215) = 3512, the false positive probability is less than
7.44× 10−8. In this paper, we use T = 2 and cN = 15 in our
experimental settings.
5 PRIVACY-PRESERVING STRENGTH
In this section, we study the privacy-preserving strength
of our inference-based framework for similarity search in
randomized Montgomery domains. In particular, we are
concerned with adversarial learning of the biometric sim-
ilarity information that can be gleaned from the search
indexes and the retrieval process. We begin by presenting
in Section 5.1 a security analysis of the three-party search
protocol to understand what an attacker can do if they
know the various primitives (i.e., multipliers and moduli)
in each indexing step. We argue that the privacy threats
may all boil down to the problem of how hard it is for the
attacker to infer the biometric identity from the user’s signa-
tures in Montgomery forms. This motivates us to apply an
information-theoretic approach for evaluating in Section 5.2
the information leakage in Montgomery domains and in
Section 5.3 the privacy gain in index generation. We further
provide in Section 5.4 a discussion on the well-known trade-
off between privacy and utility that is applied also in our
context of similarity search.
5.1 Security Analysis of the Search Protocol
In our design of the three-party search protocol, we consider
a model where the different parties do not necessarily trust
each other. We also assume that 1) the three parities do
not collude with each other, 2) the communication channel
between the parties is secure (e.g., encrypted), and 3) each
party may behave in a curious-but-honest way, i.e., it fol-
lows the search protocol but may use any data in possession
to glean additional information [5], [6], [28], [29]. As shown
in Fig. 3, the three parties operate in separate Montgomery
domains defined by the corresponding primitive pair, i.e.,
(R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u ) for the user, (R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ) for the data owner,
and (R
(i)
s , N
(i)
s ) for the server. The following discusses the
privacy threat in eachmain procedure of the search protocol.
User Enrolment: The attacker may seize user signatures
in the form of M(p˜
(i)
j ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u ), but is not likely to know
the user’s primitive pair (R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u ), as the latter is kept
private to the user. In Section 5.2, we show that recov-
ering p˜
(i)
j from its Montgomery form without knowing
the primitives can be made almost as difficult as a wild
guess. On the other hand, even if the attacker is able to
crack user signatures, it needs to do so for a sufficiently
large number of users in order to derive the underlying
biometric similarity distribution. This makes the inference
cost of adversarial learning even more prohibitive.
Server Registration: We note that, if different applica-
tion servers use the same set of moduli {N
(i)
s } to register
provision of service at the data owner, the attacker can track
users covertly by cross-matching over different applications,
known as linkage attack [4]. To deal with this privacy threat,
the servers can choose different sets of moduli {N
(i)
s }, so
that the data owner can produce distinct sets of search
indexes for the same biometric database.
Index Generation: The attacker may sniff all the search
indexes generated by the data owner. Since the search
indexes are generated in the nested Montgomery form
M(M(p˜
(i)
j ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u );R
(i)
o , N
(i)
s ), the attacker cannot de-
rive the biometric similarity distribution directly from the
search indexes, as Montgomery multiplication does not
preserve the original distance values. The attacker may
alternatively attempt to glean the information by inferring
each biometric identity from the search indexes and then
performing pairwise comparisons for distance computation.
In this way, the attacker needs to compromise two layers
of Montgomery multiplications defined in the respective
Montgomery domains. We note that secure communications
can prevent the attacker from obtaining the primitives N
(i)
s ,
R
(i)
s and R
(i)
q . Otherwise, the attacker may derive the data
owner’s primitive R
(i)
o , which will enable the attacker to ob-
tainM(p˜
(i)
j ;R
(i)
u , N
(i)
u ). The privacy threat is again reduced
to cracking the user’s signatures as discussed before.
Query and Search: Recall that the obfuscated distance
measure is key to our design of the inference-based sim-
ilarity search scheme. It enables the server to retrieve
most likely candidates without knowing the exact distance
values. The attacker may attempt to glean the similarity
information from the obfuscated distance measure. As a
result, the risk of data disclosure in the retrieval process also
depends on how different the distribution of the obfuscated
distance values can be made from that of the exact distance
values, which we will discuss in Section 5.4.
5.2 Information Leakage in Montgomery Domains
In privacy studies, mutual information is often used to mea-
sure the average risk of data disclosure [41]. Accordingly, we
quantify information leakage in our context as the mutual
information between a substring data variable and its inde-
pendently generated signatures in Montgomery domains.
Specifically, consider a substring of length s bits whose
natural number representation is a discrete random variable
X with probability mass function p(x) = 2−s for all x in the
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range X = [0, 2s). The entropy of X , denoted by H(X), is
thus s bits [42]. For t = 1, 2 and given the modulus Nt, the
Montgomery form of X , denoted by Γt, is also a discrete
random variable. In particular, let R(Nt) be the set of all
eligible values of the multiplier Rt in the range (0, 2
cR) that
are coprime to Nt. Then, for X = x, every Rt ∈ R(Nt)
yields an (Rt, Nt)-residue, i.e., γt = M(x;Rt, Nt). Let all
possible values of Γt constitute the subset Gt ⊂ [0, Nt). The
mutual information between X and its Montgomery forms
Γ1,Γ2, denoted by I(X ; Γ1,Γ2), is then given by [42]
I(X ; Γ1,Γ2) = H(X)−H(X |Γ1,Γ2) . (22)
The conditional entropy H(X |Γ1,Γ2) can be obtained by
the chain rule for entropy [42] as
H(X |Γ1,Γ2) = H(Γ1,Γ2, X)−H(Γ1,Γ2) (23)
where H(Γ1,Γ2, X) and H(Γ1,Γ2) can be obtained from
the joint distribution p(x, γ1, γ2) as follows. Since Γ1 and Γ2
are independent, we have
p(x, γ1, γ2) = p(γ1, γ2 | x)p(x) = p(x)
2∏
t=1
p(γt | x) (24)
where the conditional distribution p(γt | x) can be derived
by enumerating all Rt ∈ R(Nt) with respect to Nt. The
marginal distribution p(γ1, γ2) can be obtained as
p(γ1, γ2) =
∑
x∈X
p(x, γ1, γ2) . (25)
Then, the joint entropy H(Γ1,Γ2, X) is given by
H(Γ1,Γ2, X) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
γ1∈G1
∑
γ2∈G2
p(x, γ1, γ2) log p(x, γ1, γ2)
(26)
and the joint entropy H(Γ1,Γ2) is given by
H(Γ1,Γ2) = −
∑
γ1∈G1
∑
γ2∈G2
p(γ1, γ2) log p(γ1, γ2) . (27)
Fig. 5 plots I(X ; Γ1,Γ2) with respect to the parameter
cR for s = 4, 7, 14. With cN = 15, we randomly select ten
pairs of moduliN1 andN2 from the ν(2
15) = 3512 available
primes. For each pair of N1 and N2, and for each particular
value of cR and s, we calculate I(X ; Γ1,Γ2) and present
in Fig. 5 the mean and standard deviation of I(X ; Γ1,Γ2). It
can be seen that, as cR increases, I(X ; Γ1,Γ2)monotonically
decreases and approaches zero. The larger the value of s, the
smaller is I(X ; Γ1,Γ2) when it converges.
Fig. 6 shows the effect of modulus on I(X ; Γ1,Γ2).
Given s = 7 and cR = 15, the plot displays I(X ; Γ1,Γ2)
with respect to the moduli N1 and N2 that are chosen to
span the range (0, 215). In general, as N1 or N2 increases,
I(X ; Γ1,Γ2) decreases and approaches zero. When both N1
and N2 are larger than 139, corresponding to 99 percent of
prime numbers in the range (0, 215), I(X ; Γ1,Γ2) quickly
drops to 0.066 bits. This indicates that information leakage
in Montgomery domains can also be made negligibly small
by choosing sufficiently large moduli values.
5.3 Privacy Gain in Index Generation
To measure the effect of applying privacy-preserving mech-
anisms in index generation, we introduce the notion of
privacy gain, defined in our context as the increase in the
uncertainty of inferring a biometric identity p from the
search indexes. Let pˆ be a random variable whose possible
values are estimates of p, which we recall is in the form of
a binary string of length D bits. In an information-theoretic
approach, the privacy gain can be measured by the entropy
of pˆ conditional on the knowledge of the search indexes.
Accordingly, the privacy gain is null if one directly uses the
segments {p(1),p(2), . . . ,p(L)} for indexing p as the adver-
sary can recover p = p(1)||p(2)|| . . . ||p(L) unambiguously.
On the other hand, the privacy gain is maximum, i.e.,D bits,
if the search indexes are generated in an uninformative way.
Let us consider what if we use exactly the original
form of the obfuscated segments {V
p(1) ,Vp(2) , . . . ,Vp(L)} for
hash-based indexing. It is clear in this case that, for any i,
an estimate of p(i) has only two outcomes in the set V
p(i) ,
i.e., pˆ(i) = p˜
(i)
j for j = 0, 1 with equal probability. Thus,
the conditional entropy H(pˆ(i) | V
p(i)) is exactly one bit for
all i, and hence the privacy gain in this case is L bits.
We recall that the baseline “LSH + partial distance”
approach [29] generates the search indexes by performing
random sampling of bit positions. As a result, the more the
distinct positions that are sampled, the less is the uncer-
tainty left in inferring the biometric identity. The privacy
gain of the LSH-based approach is thus equal to the number
of unknown bits. For comparison, we randomly sample an
input string with s = 8 bits at a time for L = 50 times
with replacement. We perform simulations over 100,000
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Fig. 7. Effect of distance obfuscation with L = 30 for the UBIRIS dataset. (a) Mapping from Hamming distance d to obfuscated distance measurem.
(b) Histogram of d and that ofm for neighbouring pairs with d ≤ 50. (c) Histogram of d and that of m for non-neighbouring pairs with d > 50.
input strings each of length 400 bits. The input bits are
independently generated and each bit is 0 or 1 with equal
probability. The results show that the privacy gain in such a
context is 147 bits on average.
Now, consider our proposed index generation scheme
using the Montgomery form of each substring p˜
(i)
j ∈ Vp(i) .
In this context, if every p˜
(i)
j has two independently gener-
ated signatures in Montgomery domains, we have a total of
four randomized signatures for indexing p(i), denoted by
Γ
(i)
1 ,Γ
(i)
2 ,Γ
(i)
3 ,Γ
(i)
4 . In this case, let us again treat the natural
number representation of pˆ(i) as a discrete random variable
X with probability mass function p(x) = 2−s for all x in the
range X = [0, 2s). Then, in a similar manner to the way we
calculate H(X |Γ1,Γ2) in Section 5.2 through (23)-(27), and
setting s = 8, cR = 15, cN = 15, we obtain the mean value of
the conditional entropy H(pˆ(i) | Γ
(i)
1 ,Γ
(i)
2 ,Γ
(i)
3 ,Γ
(i)
4 ) as 7.82
bits and therefore the privacy gain is 391 bits for L = 50,
which is rather close to D = 400 bits in this case.
5.4 Privacy-Utility Trade-off in Similarity Search
As discussed in Section 3, the distance obfuscation mech-
anism in the MIMP scheme enables inference-based simi-
larity search to make judicious test decisions based on the
obfuscated distance measure without the need of directly
evaluating the Hamming distance. For any particular pair of
p and q, given the number of substrings L and the value of
m that is obtained from (7), the Hamming distance d(p,q)
is concealed in an interval given by (9) that depends on
the value of m. This is analogous to the concept of data
anonymization [31].
It is important to note that the parameter L plays a
critical role in the trade-off between privacy and utility (i.e.,
search accuracy) in this context. We observe that:
• In the extreme case where L = D, each substring
has exactly one bit. Since d(p(i),q(i)) in this case
is either 0 or 1, by Proposition 1, we must have
C(V
p(i) ,Vq(i)) = 1 for all i and hence m = D
regardless of the value of d(p,q). This case yields
the maximum privacy achievable as all strings p ∈ Ω
have the same m value and thus cannot be ranked.
However, in this extreme case, the inference-based
approach does not work as similarity search is re-
duced to a wild guess, representing a worst-case
scenario for the search accuracy.
• In the other extreme case where L = 1, by Proposi-
tion 1, we must have m = 1 for d(p,q) ≤ 1, m ≤ 1
for d(p,q) = 2 and m = 0 for d(p,q) > 2. That is,
for any string p ∈ Ω, the m value is either 0 or 1. We
can determine for all strings with m = 1 that their
Hamming distance to the query is not greater than
two. For those with m = 0, they cannot be further
ranked. Accordingly, if the Hamming distance of
the true match is greater than two, which is most
likely true in a biometric database, the inference-
based search in this extreme case is also no better
than a wild guess.
Intuitively, when L is neither too large nor too small, the val-
ues of the obfuscated distance measurem are more likely to
span a wider range. As we have observed in Section 3.4 for
the UBIRIS dataset, this makes it more feasible to order the
retrieved candidates in multiple ranks and hence increases
the search accuracy of the inference-based approach.
As a result of Proposition 1, for a pair of p and q
with a particular value of m, the actual Hamming distance
d(p,q) may take any integer value from a certain range.
On the other hand, if 1 < L < D, it is clear that different
distributions of the mismatching bits between p and q can
lead to different values of m even if the Hamming distance
d(p,q) retains the same. Such a one-to-many relationship
between the Hamming distance and the obfuscated distance
measure ensures in all cases more or less privacy protection
for the inference-based approach.
Fig. 7 illustrates the effect of distance obfuscation with
L = 30 for the UBIRIS dataset. As discussed in Section
3.3, we consider a total of 3,840,000 pairwise comparisons.
Among them, given the Hamming radius r = 50, we have
6,026 neighbouring pairs and 3,833,974 non-neighbouring
pairs. In Fig. 7(a), we plot the mapping from the Hamming
distance d to the obfuscated distance measure m for all
the 3,840,000 pairwise comparisons, which clearly exhibits a
one-to-many relationship between d andm. In Fig. 7(b), we
present the histogram of d and that ofm for all neighbouring
pairs (i.e., those with d ≤ 50). Likewise, the histograms
for all non-neighbouring pairs (i.e., those with d > 50) are
presented in Fig. 7(c). In both cases, we observe that the
distribution of d is very different from that of m.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
MIMP scheme in randomized Montgomery domains for
inference-based similarity search. For ease of description,
we shall hence call it as MIMP-RM for short. As discussed
ACCEPTED BY IEEE TRANS. PATTERN ANAL. AND MACH. INTELL. 11
in Section 3.4, a simple implementation of k-NN search
using MIMP-RM is to choose the top k candidates with the
largest values of the obfuscated distance measure m. We
demonstrate that the accuracy of candidate retrieval using
this simple and privacy-preserving approach is close to that
of conventional similarity search based on explicit distance
values, but the associated cost is significantly reduced com-
pared to cryptographic methods. We implement the test
algorithms in Matlab and run the experiments on a 3.4 GHz
Intel R© machine. For all experiments, the parameters used
in MIMP-RM to generate the search indexes are T = 2,
cN = 15, and cR = 15.
6.1 Impact of Mismatching Bit Distribution
Here, we investigate how the mismatching bit distribution
can affect the retrieval performance of MIMP-RM. Specif-
ically, we randomly generate a query set containing 200
binary strings of length D = 2800 bits. For each query q,
we randomly generate a database of 200 records in the
following way. First, only ten of them are r-neighbours of
the query q where r = 350. Second, we consider three
different distributions of the mismatching bits. That is, the
positions of the mismatching bits are randomly chosen from
the range [1, D/i] for i = 1, 2, 4. In this way, a smaller i
corresponds to more evenly distributed mismatching bits
over the binary string. Given that we know the ground truth
set B(q; r) in this experiment, we perform MIMP-RM with
L = 200 on the simulated dataset and evaluate the quality
of the top k retrieved candidates.
Fig. 8 plots the precision-recall (PR) curves under the three
different mismatching bit distributions. The PR curves are
derived by varying k from 1 to 30. The results demonstrate
that both the precision and the recall can be significantly
improved if the mismatching bits are more evenly dis-
tributed. Thus, in cases where the mismatching bits are less
evenly distributed, to improve the retrieval performance
based on matching piecewise binary codes, it is helpful
to apply a random synchronized permutation to binary
feature vectors before performing the search. The results
also show that the precision is very high when the recall
is low, corresponding to the cases where k is small and
indicating that the retrieved candidates are mostly relevant.
This further demonstrates the effectiveness of inference-
based r-neighbour detection where the retrieved candidates
with large m values have a high probability that they are
r-neighbours of the query as discussed in Section 3.3.
6.2 Impact of the Parameter L
In Section 5, we argued that the number of substrings L
is an important parameter of MIMP-RM. In particular, we
showed in Section 5.2 that, to reduce the information leak-
age in randomized Montgomery domains, it is desirable
to choose a large value of s, corresponding to a small
value of L. In Section 5.4, we established that choosing an
appropriate value for L is also subject to a fundamental
trade-off between privacy and search accuracy. Here, we
provide more extensive results and further demonstrate the
impact of L on the search accuracy of MIMP-RM.
The experiments are conducted on public biometric
datasets. In addition to the UBIRIS dataset, we also consider
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Fig. 8. Retrieval performance of MIMP-RM on the simulated dataset with
positions of mismatching bits randomly chosen from a range.
two benchmark face datasets. In particular, the LFW dataset
[43] includes 13,233 face images crawled from the Internet
for 5,749 subjects, and the FERET dataset [44] contains 2,400
face images of 200 subjects each with 12 images taken under
semi-controlled environment.
Nowadays, face recognition based on features learned
from deep convolution networks, known as deep features,
can achieve an accuracy over 99 percent on the once hardest
LFW dataset [3]. For the LFW dataset, we leverage the state-
of-the-art deep features learned from a CNN framework
[45]. The deep network is trained on the CASIA-WebFace
dataset [46]. Here, we use LSH embedding [47] to convert
the deep features into a binary string representation of 400
bits per LFW face image. To test our method with different
data characteristics, we employ supervised PCA features
on the FERET dataset. Specifically, we use six face samples
per identity for training and six face samples for testing.
We apply linearly separable subcodes [14] to convert the
less robust PCA features into binary string representations
of 448 bits per FERET face image, followed by a random
synchronized permutation.
We enrol one sample per identity in the database and
use another sample of that identity to search in each run of
the experiments. The search accuracy is evaluated in terms
of the hit rate, defined as the percentage of queries with
true match found in the top k retrieved candidates. Fig. 9
presents the search accuracy results obtained by varying k
from 1 to 30. We test four different values of L, i.e., 25, 50,
75 and 100, respectively.
For all the three datasets, we observe that the hit rate
increases significantly from L = 25 to L = 50 and drops at
L = 100, which is consistent with discussions in Section 5.4.
We also observe that the hit rate seems to peak at L = 75
since there is only a marginal improvement from L = 50
to L = 75. To understand this latter effect, we perform
an empirical study on the test samples of each database,
and it reveals that over 99 percent of true match pairs have
a Hamming distance smaller than r∗ = 150. Recall from
Proposition 2 that, in this case, with L > r∗/2 = 75, all such
true match pairs are guaranteed to have a collision count
and thus can be detected. Accordingly, in the context of
MIMP-RM, choosing L = r∗/2may serve as a rule of thumb
for maximizing the search accuracy, and one may use a
smaller L value to strike a balance between search accuracy
and privacy while reducing the information leakage of hash-
based indexing in randomized Montgomery domains.
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Fig. 9. Impact of the parameter L on the search accuracy of MIMP-RM with respect to the top k retrieved candidates. (a) The UBIRIS dataset. (b)
The LFW dataset. (c) The FERET dataset.
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Fig. 10. Performance comparison in terms of the search accuracy with respect to the top k retrieved candidates. (a) The UBIRIS dataset. (b) The
LFW dataset. (c) The FERET dataset.
6.3 Search Accuracy
We demonstrate the effectiveness of MIMP-RM in search
accuracy by comparing it with two baseline approaches that
can be used in the context of privacy-preserving similarity
search. In addition to the “LSH + partial distance” ap-
proach [29], we also consider what we call the “exhaustive
Hamming” approach that performs exhaustive search by
pairwise comparison based on full-string representations
in Hamming space. Note that “exhaustive Hamming” pro-
vides the highest search accuracy that is achievable with
secure computation methods as the latter can retain one-
to-one matching accuracy in the encrypted domain [22].
However, such cryptography-based methods require pair-
wise comparison in the encrypted domain and have high
computation cost as will be shown in Section 6.4.
For “LSH + partial distance”, we generate the unen-
crypted part by random sampling of bit positions as in
Section 5.3. In this way, we create L hash tables each
being indexed by sub-hash codes of s bits. To increase the
ambiguity of query information for the server [28], each
sub-hash code of the query has one bit value omitted so
that the server needs to fill the absent bits. The retrieved
candidates from the hit buckets are then ranked in the
ascending order of their partial distance computed from the
plaintext bit positions, i.e., the unencrypted part of the full-
string representation.
Fig. 10 plots the search accuracy of the comparing meth-
ods in terms of the hit rate with respect to the k value. The
parameter L is set to 50, 50 and 56 for the UBIRIS dataset,
the LFW dataset and the FERET dataset, respectively, which
results in s = 8 in all cases. We observe that MIMP-RM
performs closely to “exhaustive Hamming”, especially in
Figs. 10(a) and 10(b) where the full-string representations
are highly discriminative in Hamming space. In all cases,
MIMP-RM outperforms “LSH + partial distance” signif-
icantly. We believe it is mainly because the LSH-based
approach in general has a low recall especially when the
number of random hash functions is relatively small. In the
above setting, the average number of plaintext bit positions
is 233, 233 and 261 for the three datasets, respectively,
representing about 58 percent of the full-string length. In
contrast, MIMP-RM utilizes the full-string binary feature
but in an obfuscated way that can provide highly accurate
search results while increasing the uncertainty for adversar-
ial learning in randomized Montgomery domains.
6.4 Computation Cost in Montgomery Domains
Index generation and search in our proposed MIMP-RM
approach mainly involve computing nested Montgomery
forms. As discussed in Section 4.1, the Montgomery form
of a natural number can be evaluated efficiently via (15). To
demonstrate the efficiency of computation in Montgomery
domains, we compare it with two popular cryptographic
methods, namely Paillier homomorphic encryption and the
cryptographic hash function of SHA-256. We implement the
former with the homomorpheR library and the latter with
the sodium library on an R platform.
Table 2 provides the computation cost of each method
conducted in R/3.2.2. The results are obtained for encoding
piecewise binary codes that are generated from the UBIRIS
dataset. The resulting cipher codes are further compressed
using ZIP. We evaluate the computation cost by four mea-
sures. In particular, “Ciphertext size” and “Zipped file size”
refer to the file size before and after compression, respec-
tively. “Encoding time” refers to the CPU time required for
encoding all records in the database. “Scanning time” refers
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TABLE 2
Comparison of computation cost for encoding piecewise binary codes generated from the UBIRIS dataset
Ciphertext size (MB) Zipped file size (MB) Encoding time (sec) Scanning time (sec)
Paillier homomorphic encryption 24 3.8 168.98 301.03
Cryptographic hash function (SHA-256) 3 0.437 81.72 140.26
Nested Montgomery form 0.155 0.029 1.01 0.0045
to the CPU time required for a linear scan of the database
for pairwise matching.
It can be seen in Table 2 that randomized signatures
generated in Montgomery domains have much smaller
code size and higher processing speed. Using the nested
Montgomery forms, encoding is over 150 times faster and
scanning is up to five orders of magnitude faster than that
using Paillier homomorphic encryption. The results confirm
that the efficiency of computation is significantly improved
when done in Montgomery domains.
7 CONCLUSION
We have studied the problem of privacy-preserving similar-
ity search in a biometric database to withstand adversarial
machine learning based on the critical biometric similarity
information. Unlike existing privacy protection methods for
biometric identification that are in general required to per-
form cumbersome distance comparisons in the encrypted
domain, the new approach proposed in this paper is based
on statistical inference and carefully designed data obfus-
cation mechanisms that obviate the need for comparing
exact distance values. We have also proposed to protect
the data structures by performing hash-based indexing in
randomized Montgomery domains with virtually negligi-
ble information leakage. Experiments on public biometric
datasets have confirmed that candidate retrieval using our
simple and privacy-preserving approach is both statistically
reliable and computationally efficient. In future work, we
are interested in extending the inference-based approach
to other biometric modalities such as fingerprints that do
not have a fixed-length binary string representation. We are
also interested in extending the inference-based approach
to search problems with distance measures other than in
Hamming space.
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